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-vs-

HANSEN AND HANSEN

250 East Broadway,' Suite 100
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,•
·1<".

Attorneys for Appellant
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
15551

-vsFREDRICK WILLIAM ALBERT,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with theft as defined in
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (1) (c)

(1953), as amended, in

violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1953), as amended,
a Class A misdemeanor.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant pled guilty to the crime as charged in
the information and was sentenced to serve six (6) months
in the Duchesne County Jail.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order affirming the judgment
of the court below.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On October 26, 1977, appellant appeared for
arraignment before the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, Judge
of the Fourth Judicial District Court.

Appellant was

not represented by counsel because he had been unable to
pay his attorney a retainer fee and his attorney therefore
refused to appear without payment of the fee (T.1,2).
Appellant nevertheless attempted to enter a
guilty plea, but the court refused to entertain the plea
until appellant was represented by counsel (T.2).
The prosecuting attorney then asked the court,
"If they confer with counsel today, may this come back
on at the end of the calendar?"

(T.2).

Appellant conferred with attorney George E.
Mangan and the matter came before the court again (T.20).
At this proceeding appellant entered a plea of guilty
(T. 4) •

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ADEQUATELY DETERMINED THAT
APPELLANT'S PLEA WAS BOTH VOLUNTARY AND GIVEN WITH AN
UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF A GUILTY PLEA.
The constitutional standard for the taking of
a guilty plea is set out in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238
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(1968), which requires a court both to advise a defendant
of the several constitutional rights that will be waived
by entry of a guilty plea and to determine that the
appellant's plea is being given voluntarily and with an
understanding of its consequences.
In the present case appellant appeared in court
with William Lester Mach, who had participated in the
theft with appellant and who had been charged with the
same crime.

Mr. Mach also had been initially represented

by Mr. Van Seiver.

Mr. Mach's case was called up first

and the court conducted the following interrogation:
"THE COURT: To the charge
contained in the information what
is your plea?
MR. MACH: Guilty.
THE COURT: How old are you?
MR. MACH: Thirty one.
THE COURT: How much schooling
have you had?
MR. MACH: High school.
THE COURT: Can you read and
write?
MR. MACH: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: You understand that
the penalty for this offense is up to
a year in the Duchesne County jail?
MR. MACH:
I do.
THE COURT: Have you seen the
inside of the Duchesne County jail?
MR. MACH: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: You still want to
plead guilty?
MR. MACH: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: You understand you have
the right to compel the county attorney
to prove everything contained in this
charge against you to a jury of eight
people and beyond a reasonable doubt?
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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MR. MACH:
I du.
THE COURT: And you are
asking me to let you waive that
right?
MR. MACH: Yes.
THE COURT: You have a right
to appeal that decision if it
should be against you to the
Supreme Court of this State.
MR. MACH: Yes.
THE COURT: You are asking me
to let you waive that right, is
that correct?
MR. MACH. Yes.
THE COURT: By entering a
plea of guilty, you understand,
you are doing more than just
admitting the offense. You are
entering that kind of verdict
against yourself. Do you understand that?
MR. MACH: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Has anybody
promised you anything for entering
a plea of guilty?
MR. MACH: No, sir.
THE COURT: Has anybody made
any threats against you as to what
would happen if you didn't enter
a plea of guilty?
MR. MACH: No.
THE COURT: Do you have any
reason to think the court would
pronounce a different kind of
judgment if you pleaded guilty
than it would if you were tried
and found guilty?
MR. MACH: No, sir.
THE COURT: What happened
that makes you want to plead guilty?
What did you do that brought this
charge against you?
MR. MACH:
I had some stolen
property in my possession.
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THE COURT: Did you know at
that tirne that it was stolen?
MR. MACH: Shortly prior to
that, yes.
THE COURT: What was the
property?
MR. MACH: A lamp and a chandelier.
THE COURT: The court finds that
the defendant is understandingly and
voluntarily offering to enter a plea
of guilty and directs entry of that
plea."
(T.6-8).
Immediately following the Mach matter, the
appellant's case was called up and the court conducted
the following inquiry:
"THE COURT: To the charge
contained in the information what
is your plea?
MR. ALBERT: Guilty, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: Were these the same
transactions?
MR. DRANEY: Yes, Your Honor.
MR. MANGAN: Yes.
THE COURT: You were with Mr.
Mach I take it?
MR. ALBERT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Did you hear the
questions I asked him about his wishes
to enter a plea of guilty?
MR. ALBERT: Yes, sir, I did.
THE COURT: Would any of your
answers to those questions be any
different?
MR. ALBERT: No, sir.
THE COURT: The court finds the
defendant is voluntarily offering to
enter a plea of guilty and directs the
clerk to enter that plea."
(T.4).
Although the court did not conduct an extensive
interrogation of appellant, Judge Sorensen was satisfied
that appellant had listened to the questions asked and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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responses given in the Mach case and that appellant would
have given the same responses.

Satisfied that appellant

was pleading voluntarily and understood the consequences
of his plea, the court accepted the guilty plea.
Respondent submits that the questioning of
appellant in conjunction with the detailed interrogation
reflected in the record of the companion matter meets
the Boykin standard.
POINT II
UTAH CASE LAW CONCERNING DISTRICT COURTS'
APPLICATION OF BOYKIN V. ALABAMA,395 U.S. 238 (1968),
ADEQUATELY PROTECTSADEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
DURING THE TAKING OF A GUILTY PLEA.
Respondent rejects the notion that Utah should
adopt Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
(attached as Exhibit "A"), in order to safeguard a
defendant's rights when a guilty plea is offered.

If a

new statute is required, the Utah legislature is the
appropriate body to consider and impose such a statute.
However, respondent contends that adoption of Rule 11 is
not required to dispose of this case and that the court
should limit its ruling to the more narrow issue of
the trial court's compliance with Boykin, supra, Strong v.
Turner, 22 Utah 2d 294, 452 P.2d 323 (1969), and
State v. Forsyth, 560 P.2d 337 (Utah 1977).

These latter
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Utah cases are state interpreations of Boykin,
and

requi~e

supra,

that a guilty plea be made voluntarily,

without undue influence or coercion and that the ends
of justice be served by not allowing a person to enter
a plea of guilty to a crime he did not commit.
POINT III
APPELLANT WAS ADEQUATELY REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.
Although appellant's former attorney, Robert
Van Seiver, did not appear at the arraignment, he had
previously consulted with his client.

(See Exhibit "B".)

II MR.
ALBERT: • • • We were
in his office yesterday afternoon
and talked with him at the time • • •
And that he informed us of what was
going to take place. There was a
reduction in the charge if we were
to come over here and waive our
preliminary and plead guilty and
be able to get it taken care of
without his presence."
(T.2).

In spite of appellant's willingness to enter his
plea without an appearance by his attorney, the trial
court refused to allow such a plea.

The record is silent

on the circumstances of the hiring of attorney George
Mangan, although appellant's brief (page 8) indicates
that Mr. Mangan happened to be in the courtroom on other
business.

Appellant conferred with Mangan and was

accompanied by him when he returned to the courtroom to
offer his plea.
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Although appellant suggests that these
facts are remarkably similar to those of Alires v.
Turner, 22 Utah 2d 118, 449 P.2d 241 (1969), a close
analysis reveals that the only real similarity is
that both cases involve a guilty plea.

Alires had

had no prior contact with an attorney and the one
appointed in the courtroom exhibited no interest in
the case beyond his $100 fee and did not even remember
at sentencing that he represented Alires.

In the

present case, such egregious facts are wholly absent.
Appellant's unsupported allegation of ineffective
assistance of counsel does not meet his burden of
persuading the court that counsel failed in some
manner to represent his interests.

This Court

considered the issue in State v. Forsyth, 560 P.2d
337 (Utah 1977), and made these remarks concerning
Forsyth's complaint:
"It is not at all uncommon
for one who finds himself in
such trouble or having been
found or pleaded guilty to a
crime to turn upon and impute
fault to one who has
previously tried to assist him.
But the mere assertion of such
a charge does not prove the fact.
This is especially so because
the assertion is suffused with
such self-interest.
560 P.2d at 339.
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Beyond his unsubstantiated complaint, appellant
has offered no evidence to support his claim, and
respondent urges the Court to reject it.
CONCLUSION
As appellant knowingly and voluntarily entered
his guilty plea and received adequate, effective assistance
of counsel, respondent asks the Court to affirm the judgment
of the lower court.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
MICHAEL L. DEA~IBR
Deputy Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

-9-
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EXIIII3IT "A"

PLEAS

Rule 11

Rule 11.

Pleas
A defendant m:ty 1,lead not guilty, guilty, or
no!o contcndere. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant
corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty.
(h) Nolo Contendere. A defendant may plead nolo contendere
only with the consent of the court. Such a plea shall be accepted
by the court only after due consideration of the views of the parties
and the interest of the public in the effective administration of justice.
(c) Advice to Defendant. Before accepting a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere, the court must address the defendant personally in
open court and inform him of, and determine that he understands,
the following:
(;;)

Alternati;'e~.

(1) the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the
mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the
maximum possible penalty provided by law; and
(2) if the defendant is not represented by an attorney, that
he has the right to be represented by an attorney at every stage
of the proceeding against him and, if necessary, one will be appointed to represent him; and
(3) that he has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in
that plea if it has already been made, and that he has the right
to be tried by a jury and at that trial has the right to the assistance of counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses against him, and the right not to be compelled to incriminate himself; and
( 4) that if he pleads guilty or no lo contendere there will not
be a further trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty or nolo
contendere he waives the right to a trial; and
(5) that if he pleads guilty or nolo ccntendere, the court may
ask him questions about the offense to which he has pleaded,
and if he answers these questions under oath, on the record, and
in the presence of counsel, his answers may later be used
against him in a prosecution for perjury or false statement.
(d) Insuring Th .. t the Plea b Voluntary. The court shall not
accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, determining that the plea
is voluntary and not the result of force or threats or of promises
apart from a plea agreement. The court shall also inquire as to
whether the defendant's willingness to plead guilty or nolo contendere results from prior discussions between the attorney for the
government and the defendant or his attorney.

15
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(e)

Pl~a

Agreement Procedure.

(1) In General. The atlurney for the government and the
attorney for the defendant or the defendant when acting pro se
may engage in discussions with a view toward reaching an agreement that, upon the entering of a pica of guilty or nolo contendere to a charged offense or to a lesser or related offense,
the attorney for the government will do any of the following:
(A) move for dismissal of other charges; or
(B) make a recommendation, or agree not to oppose the
defcndant"s request, for a particular sentence, with the
understanding that such recommendation or request shall
not be binding upon the court; or
(C) agree that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of the case.
The court shall not participate in any such discussions.
(2) Notice of Such Agreement. If a plea agreement has been
reached by the parties, the court shall, on the record, require
the disclosure of the agreement in open court or, on a showing
of good cause, in camera, at the time the plea is offered. Thereupon the court may accept or reject the agreement, or may defer
its decision as to the acceptance or rejection until there has
been an opportunity to consider the presentence report.
(3) Acceptance of a Plea Agreement. If the com-t accepts
the plea agreement, the court shall inform the defendant that it
will embody in the judgment and sentence the disposition provided for in the plea agreement.
(4) Rejection of a Plea Agreement. If the court rejects the
plea agreement, the court shall, on the record, inform the parties
of this fact, advise the defendant personally in open court or,
on a showing of good cause, in camera, that the court is not
bound by the plea agreement, afford the defendant the opportunity to then withdraw his plea, and advise the defendant that
if he persists in his guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere the
disposition of the case may be less favorable to the defendant
than that contemplated by the plea agreement.
(5) Time of Pica Agreement Procedure. Except for good
cause shown, notification to the court of the existence of a plea
agreement shall be given at the arraignment or at such other
time, prior to trial, as may be fixed by the court.
(6) Inadmissibility of Pleas, Offers of Pleas, and Related
Statements. Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph,
evidence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or a plea of nolo
contendere, or of an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere to

16
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

'!

Rule 11

PLEAS

the crime charged or any other crime, or of statements made in
connection with, and relevant to, any of the foregoing pleas 01·
offers, is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding
against the person who made the plea or offer. However, evidence of a statement made in connection with, and relevant to,
a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, a plea of nolo contenderc, or
an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere to the crime charged
or any other crime, is admissible in a criminal procee<ling for
perjury or false statement if the statement was made by the defendant under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel.
(f) Determining Accuracy of Plea. Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court should not enter a judgment upon
such plea without making such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there
is a factual basis for the plea.

(g) Record of Proceedings. A verbatim record of the proceedings at which the defendant enters a plea shall be made and, if there
is a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the record shall include, without limitation, the court's advice to the defendant, the inquiry into
the voluntariness of the pica including any plea agreement, and the
inquiry into the accuracy of a guilty plea.
As amended Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 19GG; Apr. 22, 1974; July 31,
1975, Pub.L. 94-64, § 3(5)-(10), 89 Stat. 371, 372.
Historical Note
'Effedin· ])ate of An1endm~nt8 Propose1l
A11r. 2:?, 19':'.t;
Efrt"<"th·t!> nato of 1975
Am~nJme-nh.
Ame11dmeuts of this rule

crnhLaced In the ordl•r of the 1Jnlted
St:.ites Supreme Court on Apr. 22, 197-1,
rind the nmendtnents of this rule mnde
l.ly set·tion 3 of Puh.L. 94--04, cf!ecth·e

Dec. 1, 19i5, exePpt with respe<'t to the
a111endmeut adding suht.l. (e) (6) ot this
rule, dfectiYe Aug. 1, 1075, see seetion 2
at Pub.L. !»--04, :i;:et out as a 11ote under
rule 4 or the>ie rule11.
Noteit of Commlttf"6 on
J1011<;0
Jnl'l\t'i

R~r1ort

th~

Judiciary,

~o.

l"ropo1'!t"tl

9l-'.!.i7.
A.
Aua•ntlliy the Suprt"me Court.

nule 11 of the Fedcrul Rules of Criminal
Procedure deals with pleas.
The Su·
preme Court hus proposf'd to amend this
r11le extensively.
Rule 11 pro,·ld~s thnt a defendant nilly
ple.'ld guilty, not guilty, or nolo contendere. The ~uprerne Court's .amendments
f() Rule ll(b) pro\.-ide that n nolo conten<ll're plea "tdiall be acl'ellled by the
court only nfte>r due considerntion of
the \"fews or the pnrties anti the intC'rest

of tJii! public in the e£fedl\'"e administr::1-

tion of

ju~tke."

The Supreme Court ~men1Jments to Rule
JJ(c) spell out the fUlYi<'e thnt lhe court
must gi,·e to the defendnut before ncl"<'I>fing the dc!eudnnt's plea of guilty or
nolo contendere.
The Supreme Court
ameudments to Uuie ll(d) s:et forth the
ste-ps thnt the court mu!it take to h.1sure
that a i;uHty or llolo conteodere plea has
hcen \'ohmtnrily mude.
The Supreme Court an1endmcnts to
Rule l l (e) estnblish a plea ni;::rel'IPent
prnccdnrl". This procedure permits lhE"
partit-s to <liscu~s dispi)sing Q! a t:ase
without n trin1 nud sch forth Ute type
or ngreements th:tt tho parties cart rea«:h
ronct>-rning the di~positfon o! the <"3se.
'.fhe procedure is not mAndntvrY; n court
I,; frl"e not to permit the parties to pre:i;:ent J>lt>a n.i::~ementR to it.
The Supreme Court amendments to
Rule ll(f) require thnt the courc. before
entcriuK judJ,!'meut upon fl plea of 1Z11ilty,
s:..ti~!r itself tl1nt .. there Is a f;1ctuo.I
hnsls for the pll"n."

The Supreme Court
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EXHIBIT "B"
Dl':NI-TTS L. ORAm:y
DUCH::SJ·i:': COUIITY it1.'TORNI·:Y

Attornry for Pl2intiff
P. o. no:: 188G
f;.co.:e,J''.~ l.L:.:

(POl)

lYt~

8.1~.0GG

'U2_=1CG1

HJ TI IE JU.STICE COURT O? J:'IIE STi\. TE Ol''

TH~

ST\TS OF

U'r:'.I-1,

ROOSEVELT PRECINCT

U1.~H,

PL1in'.::iff,

\'IAIVER OP PRELH1IH\!\Y
HE,\ RING

-vs?R:-:DRICK \'iILLI!'cT·l ,\LBS!\T,

Def ondanc.

Crir:iinal i!e>.

Cones no1·1 the Def end ant Fredrick

2 J. 7

~lilliam

Albert,

bein<J represented by hj_s <J.ttorney, Robert Van Seiver, ;:i.nd
beinrJ fully advised of his rights to a Preliminary Hearing
on the charge in this matter, and does hereby waive his right
to s2.id hearing.
D~TED

H.OH~~H'r

°'i~·'..t!

this

26~ d~y

of October, 1977.

SC.LVf~R

Attorney for Defcnd2nt
STGNED before r.1e this 2Gth day of Oc-tober, 1977.
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